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InstitutionSegregation models often focus on private racial preference but overlook the institutional context. This
paper represents an effort to move beyond the preference centricity. In this paper, an ideal Pigovian reg-
ulatory intervention is emulated and added into Schelling’s (1971) classic spatial proximity model of
racial segregation, with an aim to preserve collective welfare against the negative externalities induced
by the changing local racial compositions after individual relocations. A key discovery from a large num-
ber of cellular automata is that the Pigovian regulation tends to result in less segregated but also less efﬁ-
cient (in terms of aggregate utility) residential patterns than laissez faire. This ﬁnding, albeit from a highly
stylized model, bears intellectual relations to an important practical question: What are the potential
racial effects of Pigovian local planning interventions, such as ﬁnancially motivated anti-density zoning
or the collection of a development impact fee? On top of its modest policy implications, this paper dem-
onstrates a bottom-up computational modelling approach to reconcile the preference-based and institu-
tion-orientated academic perspectives regarding racial residential segregation.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
As a longstanding American urban phenomenon, residential
segregation by race involves both preferential and institutional
reasons. However, scholarship on this subject tends to fragment,
eliciting a quite clear divide between the preference-based versus
the institution-orientated perspectives. For instance, Schelling’s
(1971) classic segregation models1 build entirely upon individual
preference regarding the community level racial composition, with
little attention paid to the local regulatory context. This feature
seems to persist in Schelling’s contemporary counterparts (Card
et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2003; Clark, 1991; Fossett & Waren, 2005;
Wang, 2011; Zhang, 2011). On the other hand, since the seminal
work by Massey and Denton (1993), inquiries about the institutional
causes of racial segregation have mushroomed, primarily relying on
more qualitative methods coupled with in-depth case studies
(Squires & Kubrin, 2005; Squires & O’Connor, 2001).
This paper may be seen as an attempt to move beyond the
aforementioned preference-institution divide. Revisiting Schel-
ling’s (1971) classic spatial proximity model, this study explores
the segregation outcomes in an artiﬁcial municipality which regu-
lates individual agent actions for the sake of collective welfare inan ideal Pigou (1920) style, by explicitly accounting for and adjust-
ing the potential negative externalities of all private transactions
and relocations. In methodological terms, this piece resonates with
earlier works by Webster and Wu (2001) and Heikkila and Wang
(2009), among others, in trying to redress the micro-foundations
of bottom-up computational models from an institutional econom-
ics perspective. While the word ‘‘institution’’, according to North
(1990), can stand both for formal interventions and informal con-
ventions, its ﬁrst connotation is mainly referred to hereafter.
The relation between racial residential segregation and local
planning regulation has for long been debated. For example, Nel-
son, Sanchez, et al. (2004) studied the data about major US metro-
politan areas in the 1990s, but found no signiﬁcant statistical
relations between segregation measured in dissimilarity index
and the adoption of such planning interventions as restrictive land
use zoning, impact fee collection, and building permit caps. By con-
trast, another empirical study later by Rothwell and Massy (2009)
identiﬁed ﬁnancially motivated anti-density zoning as a signiﬁcant
factor in excluding, though covertly, ethnic minorities from White
dominated residential suburbs.
Unlike the previous studies, this paper is intended to address
the above debate from a more generic modelling perspective.
Cellular automaton is employed in this study as a simpliﬁed
agent-based simulation approach (Batty, 2009) to revisit
Schelling’s (1971) seminal spatial proximity model, which assumes
a gridded urban spatial structure resembling a checkerboard that
contains a ﬁnite number of locations. Each location can be easily
represented by a cell, with every cell either accommodating a Black(2013),
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faction, measured in terms of utility, only depends on the racial
composition of its neighbours, who live upon the nearest sur-
rounding cells. When a household is unsatisﬁed with the local ra-
cial make-up, it seeks to move to another location. In Schelling
(1971) relocation is essentially free insofar as the space allows.
In the present model, however, any relocation imposing a net so-
cial cost upon the whole municipal community is prohibited. This
could be framed as an ideal Pigou (1920) scenario, wherein the
externalities of individual action are perfectly explicit and internal-
ized through interventions, making the aggregate social cost tanta-
mount to the accounted private cost; action stops when the cost is
too high.
A large number of simulations show that a municipality which
governs individual agents using the Pigovian mode of regulation
eventually tends to generate less aggregate utility, but also be-
comes less racially segregated than in the Schelling original. Be-
sides its quite intriguing, albeit admittedly modest, policy
implications, this study illustrates the relevance of cellular autom-
aton, as a kind of bottom-up computational modelling approach, to
urban planning research in general and segregation studies in par-
ticular, given the profound spatial as well as institutional complex-
ities therein contained (Batty, 2007).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section reviews Schelling’s (1971) spatial proximity model and
points out that the model can be modiﬁed to account for Pigovian
local regulation as a stylized institutional factor. This is followed by
the set up of cellular automaton in this paper, with the simulation
results reported and analyzed afterwards. The penultimate section
discusses the policy and intellectual implications. Conclusions are
drawn in the end, along with suggestions for future research.2. Schelling and Pigou
2.1. Schelling’s spatial proximity model
The phenomenon of residential segregation by race not only
draws urban planners’ attention, but also interests economists.
Thomas Schelling (1971) is one of the ﬁrst mainstream economists
who have looked into the dynamics of segregation. From a game-
theoretic perspective Schelling modelled segregation in a spatially
explicit fashion. Schelling found that ethnic integration would
eventually be improbable, even if individual agents have only mild
racial preference and just avoid becoming ethnic minority in their
local neighbourhoods.
Fig. 1 below illustrates the structure of private racial preference
in Schelling’s spatial proximity model. The two vertical axes inFig. 1. Private racial preference in Schelling’s spatial proximity model.
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household’s satisfaction respectively with housing when living in
a neighbourhood. The horizontal x axis shows the percentage of
neighbours who are African Americans.
Schelling assumed that a household, whether Black or White,
would dislike becoming racial minority within a neighbourhood
and would want to move away immediately if that happened.
Otherwise a household would stay happily at its current place
and remain indifferent to its neighbours’ ethnic identity. Let U = 0
denote dissatisfaction and U = 1 stand for satisfaction. Hence the
utility function is binary for both a White and a Black household:
Uw ¼
1; when; x 6 50%
0; when; x > 50%

ð1ÞUb ¼
1; when ; xP 50%
0; when; x < 50%

ð2Þ
Eqs. (1) and (2) are represented respectively by two lines in
Fig. 1, one marked with blank and the other with solid diamonds.
The dotted line in Fig. 1 stands for a catastrophic transition in util-
ity from 0 to 1 or vice versa.
Schelling deﬁned neighbourhoods explicitly in spatial terms. He
ﬁrst examined locations on a line, upon which every point has
eight neighbouring points, four on each side. He then moved to a
two dimensional checkerboard model, in which a neighbourhood
is usually made up of nine cells forming a 3 * 3 square, hence a typ-
ical Moore neighbourhood. This rule however does not apply to
neighbourhoods in the urban periphery, which may contain less
than nine cells given the boundary constraint.
For an illustrative example, in Fig. 2 above, there is a 3 * 3
square containing nine white cells, numbered from 1 to 9. Cell 9
in the center of this white square has eight neighbours, including
all of the cells surrounding it. Note that this particular neighbour-
hood is unique for cell 9. In fact every cell in Schelling’s checker-
board model perceives its neighbourhood in reference to the
cell’s own location; no cell shares exactly the same neighbourhood
with another cell.
Schelling also allowed any discontent households to move
freely to wherever they want, as long as the space is available. It
should be noted that Schelling did presume a certain number of
vacancies in the checkerboard so that an unsatisﬁed household
could relocate to one of the preferred untaken spots and in the
mean time leave a new vacancy available for other unhappy
agents.2.2. The Pigovian interventions
Schelling’s free moving scheme exempliﬁes a typical institu-
tional arrangement in most standard segregation models. But con-
trary to what is emulated in Schelling, a household’s location
choice, in reality, is often affected by the various forms of regula-
tory planning control. One primary example is residential zoning.
In many afﬂuent suburban communities, the local zoning2 3 4
1 9 5
8 7 6
Fig. 2. An illustration of the neighbourhood in Schelling (1971).
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occupancy (Fischel, 2000, 2004). More price-based interventions
include charging a one shot upfront impact fee toward a new res-
idential development (Ihlanfeldt & Shaughnessy, 2004). Otherwise
if a municipality is managed by a local homeowner association, a
new participant is often required to deposit a considerable amount
of membership dues (Mckenzie, 1994; Teaford, 1997).
Notwithstanding the diverse forms of planning regulations,
economists consider most of these interventions essentially Pigo-
vian, in the sense of aiming to internalize the negative externalities
that private deals can cause to the local community as a whole
(Fischel, 2000; Ihlanfeldt & Boehm, 1987). For example, an individ-
ual homeowner letting a single family house to multiple house-
holds usually means the entire community is burdened with
extra demand for local infrastructures such as water and sewage
services. This kind of private party transaction, in economics terms,
reduces the utility of those who are not directly involved in and
thus external to the deal, often ending up with net social cost.
Anti-density zoning resolves such externality issues by restricting
the supply of land, capping the number of residents per unit, and
essentially raising the price of housing for potential home buyers
and renters. Compared with zoning, collecting an impact fee is
even more direct by charging the newcomers a sum of payment
to offset the negative externalities of immigration. Interventions
in the both cases are Pigovian, in the sense of forcing a concerned
individual to be responsible for the social cost of private
transactions.
Certainly, the exercise of any intervention in practice is always
contingent upon a variety of political, cultural or even coincidental
factors and thus much more complex than described above. Yet
notwithstanding the real world complexity, it is both possible
and reasonable to incorporate a stylized Pigovian intervention into
Schelling’s classic spatial proximity model of racial segregation.
Note that the same externality issue actually also lurks in Schel-
ling’s model. Since every household cares about the racial make
up of its neighbourhood, a household’s utility might be affected ad-
versely when the old neighbours move away and new families
come in, which may result in an undesirable change in the racial
composition of local neighbourhood (Pancs & Vriend, 2007). If
the entire community ends up with a net loss in welfare due to
the relocations of a few individual agents, a Pigovian regulatory
intervention becomes justiﬁable, for the same reason that zoning
and impact fees, for instance, are rationalized in practice.2.3. Toward an integrated modelling approach
To date it remains controversial how the variegated local plan-
ning regulations can affect the pattern of racial residential segrega-
tion. The debate revolves particularly around the effect of zoning
on local ethnic diversity. On one hand critics like Sager (1969)
and Seitles (1998) have ﬁercely charged exclusionary zoning as
de facto racial discrimination in the housing market. Their key
claim is that the US housing market is imbued with racially dis-
criminatory private preference. Zoning covertly institutionalizes
such private discrimination in the name of protecting communal
interest. On the other hand, researchers like Fischel (2004) insist
that zoning does not directly target race, since lower income rent-
ers and homebuyers of any ethnic background can be priced out of
the market due to such ordinances as density control. More empir-
ical research also shows divergent results. For example, Nelson
et al. (2004) suggests that there is no signiﬁcant statistical relations
between the degree of segregation and the exercise of planning
interventions such as restrictive land use zoning, impact fee collec-
tion, or building permit caps in major US metropolitan areas duringPlease cite this article in press as: Wang, Y. Beyond preference: Modelling segre
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anti-density zoning and impact fee collections did seem to signiﬁ-
cantly exclude African Americans from White dominated residen-
tial suburbs.
The above controversy can be partly attributed to the gap be-
tween what is modelled and what is happening in reality. Conven-
tional segregation models tend to place an overwhelming weight
on private preferences regarding the community level racial com-
position, while largely neglecting the local regulatory context (e.g.,
Card et al., 2008; Chen, 2003; Clark, 1991; Fossett & Waren, 2005;
Wang, 2011; Zhang, 2011). A more integrated approach would not
only look at the individual’s racial preferences, but also account for
the institutional factors that affect agent’s decisions and actions.
Recent years have seen a mounting number of publications in this
direction (e.g., Benenson et al., 2009; Grauwin, Bertin, et al., 2009;
Pancs & Vriend, 2007).
A strengthened notion about the interplay between private
choices and public institutions, arguably, also features many con-
temporary developments in the general ﬁeld of computational ur-
ban spatial modelling. For instance, Webster and Wu (2001) used a
cellular simulation to justify localized land use control from a Coa-
sian efﬁciency perspective. Heikkila and Wang (2009) also deliver
an agent-based model of polycentic urban form and illustrate the
implicit yet critical inﬂuence of social institutions on urban spatial
structure. The both works, among many others, demonstrate a re-
newed appreciation of the microeconomic foundations of bottom-
up computational urban modelling, aiming perceptively at emulat-
ing spontaneous agent actions given certain types of institutional
structures. Bottom-up computational modelling deployed in such
fashion, according to Batty (2007), has arisen as an essential ap-
proach to understanding and unravelling social and behavioural
complexities underpinning urban spatial structures. In a similar
spirit, the next section of this paper presents a cellular automaton
as a simpliﬁed agent-based model (Batty, 2009), whereby an indi-
vidual agent’s freedom of action in Schelling’s spatial proximity
model is regulated and restrained for the sake of collective welfare.3. A cellular automaton approach
A cellular automaton is coded in Visual Basic after a substantial
modiﬁcation and secondary programming based on Teknomo’s
(2001) original codes. The speciﬁc model setup is detailed below.
3.1. Deﬁning neighbourhood
There is a municipal space which contains N * N cells as land
parcels available for housing. The deﬁnition of neighbourhood
mostly follows the Schelling (1971) original, with one difference.
While Schelling allows a certain number of cells to be vacant, in
the revised model all cells are occupied, either by a Black or a
White household. This setting is necessary because the revised
model involves a moving-by-swapping algorithm as detailed
below.
3.2. The moving algorithm
Since there is no vacant cell available, a discontent household
can move only by exchanging its current location with another cell.
Adapted from Zhang’s (2011), a moving-by-swapping algorithm is
employed in this paper, guided by the principle of Pareto optimiza-
tion. Speciﬁcally, imagine two households from a same racial group
who could swap their locations. Yet since the both agents have the
same utility function, a trade would make neither better off; both
would remain unhappy. In contrast a transaction between twogation under regulation. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems (2013),
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and possibly increase the total payoffs. Given Eqs. (1) and (2), Eq.
(3) holds for any individual location:
Uw þ Ub ¼ 1 )
Ub ¼ 1; if; Uw ¼ 0
Uw ¼ 1; if ; Ub ¼ 0

ð3Þ
Eq. (3) has the following intuition: A household will deal with
another only if, (a) they are from different racial group, and, (b)
one of the two is unhappy at its present location. In other words,
a household would always end up satisﬁed by dealing with an un-
happy household, insofar as the two households are from different
ethnic groups. Note that this does not necessarily mean the former
would have to be better off, since an agent can be content already
before it switches. On the other hand, a discontent household can
never become any further worse off; swapping location is never-
theless possible (yet not guaranteed) to make the unsatisﬁed hap-
py again. In summary an exchange between two racially different
households must be Pareto improving (Zhang, 2011). Thus given
the principle of Pareto improving, two households from different
racial backgrounds would always agree to a deal, as long as at least
one of them is unsatisﬁed with the existing condition.
An implicit assumption underlying this model concerns the vi-
sion of individual agent. An agent is assumed to only see the imme-
diately adjacent peers, in the same way as it delineates its own
neighbourhood. However one may also consider a trade between
two faraway agents made up of multiple rounds of local transac-
tions as the two agents move closer and closer throughout the pro-
cess of spatial simulation. Now assume that spatial proximity
decides the priority in deal-making. According to Eqs. (1) and (2),
a discontent family must have more than half of its neighbours
from the alternative ethnic group, so it has to choose which neigh-
bour gets priority. In this model a household is supposed to start
looking from the cell immediately to the left of it and then move
clockwise until it ﬁnds the ﬁrst possible dealmaker within its
neighbourhood. For an illustrative example, a household upon cell
9 in Fig. 2 would search from cell 1 to 8, following the numerical
sequence clockwise, until it identiﬁes a suitable neighbour to trade
the locations. Similar rule applies to a household located in the ur-
ban periphery with less than eight neighbours.3.3. The rule of transition without regulation
As there are only two kinds of households inhabiting the muni-
cipal space, every cell can exhibit only two possible racial states, or
formally, s 2 fw; bg, where w denotes White and b stands for Black.
Also note that an unhappy agent can always ﬁnd a racially different
neighbour who is willing to exchange locations. Thus a Markovian
transition function for any single cell may be expressed as the
follows:
si;tþ1 ¼ w; if; U
i;t
b ¼ 0; or; Uj;tw ¼ 0
b; if; Ui;tw ¼ 0; or; Uj;tb ¼ 0
(
ð4Þ
si;tþ1 denotes the state of cell i at time t + 1, which depends on the
utility of a household occupying cell i at time t. Given the mov-
ing-by-swapping algorithm, an unhappy household will always
switch with a neighbour located at cell j from the other racial group.
Otherwise a happy family would simply stay. Another possibility is
that a household, whether happy or not, has to swap its home with
a nearby unhappy agent who is racially different and taking cell j at
time t. (A caveat is that cell j’s relative location to cell i is not ﬁxed in
a spatial sense. Instead one may assume that an agent upon cell j
always gets the priority to deal with an agent upon cell i, as long
as there is a deal to make.) This would also trigger a transition in
cell i’s racial state from time t to t + 1. Finally the sojourn betweenPlease cite this article in press as: Wang, Y. Beyond preference: Modelling segre
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has to update its ethnic state once as per Eq. (4).
3.4. Pigovian regulation
Regulation in this model targets the aggregate household utility
within the municipality averaged by the number of households.
The following Eq. (5) assesses the average utility, denoted as w,
at time t across the municipal space.
wt ¼
XNN
i¼1
Ui;tsi;t=ðN  NÞ ð5Þ
Instead of maximizing wt, regulation in this model aims to en-
sure that no location swapping would ever diminish wt. To formal-
ize this type of regulation, let ni$j;t denote the net social proﬁt or
aggregate efﬁciency gain that a location swap between two house-
holds at cell i and cell j at time t can produce for the entire local
municipality. As indicated in Eq. (6) below, ni$j;t is assumed to be
made up of two parts. One part is the total private pay-offs for
the two households involved in the exchange, denoted as Pi$j;t .
The other part is, Ei$j;t , the externality this transaction imposes
upon the other local households which are not directly engaged
in the deal. Ei$j;t < 0 implies a negative externality induced by
the private transaction.
ni$j;t ¼ Pi$j;t þ Ei$j;t ð6Þ
If Pi$j;t þ Ei$j;t < 0, or in other words, ni$j;t < 0, the transaction
entails an overall inefﬁciency or a net social cost and will be forbid-
den under Pigovian regulation for the sake of infringing collective
interest. This may also be understood as a scenario wherein the
two private parties cannot make sufﬁcient proﬁts to afford a Pigo-
vian impact fee that is intended to make up for the induced nega-
tive externality. Otherwise the exchange will be endorsed. In this
vein, the following relationship is readily deducible:
wtþ1 ¼ wt þ
XN
j¼1
XN
i¼1
ni$j;t=ðN  NÞ; only if; ni$j;t  0; ð7Þ
) wtþ1 P wt8t
Eq. (7) says that the regulation tends to improve or, at least,
would never reduce the overall household utility in a municipality.
To ensure that this condition holds, a backtracking algorithm is ap-
plied when coding the model in Visual Basic (Gurari, 1999).
3.5. The rule of transition under regulation
Incorporating Pigovian regulation into the model requires the
rule of transition aforementioned in Eq. (4) to be accordingly mod-
iﬁed as illustrated in Eq. (8) below:
si;tþ1 ¼ W ; if ; U
i;t
b ¼ 0; or; Uj;tw ¼ 0; and; ni$j;t P 0
B; if ; Ui;tw ¼ 0; or; Uj;tb ¼ 0; and; ni$j;t P 0
(
Recall that ni$j;t only exists when there is at least one unhappy
agent either taking cell i or cell j at time t. Otherwise no transaction
would happen between two satisﬁed agents.
3.6. The stopping conditions
Because cellular automaton is a simulation approach, some
stopping conditions need to be speciﬁed in advance. In the case
of this model a key interest lies with the average housing utility,
wt. If the value of wt remains constant for N iterations, or formally,
wTþN ¼ wTþN1 ¼    ¼ wT ð9Þgation under regulation. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems (2013),
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Otherwise the simulation should also stop after a sufﬁciently large
number of iterations, which equals to the total number of cells in-
volved in the model:
T ¼ N  N ð10Þ3.7. The initial segregation pattern
An initial racial residential pattern needs to be placed upon the
municipal space as a starting point of the simulation. As in the
Schelling original, two types of distribution are generated ran-
domly by computer as the initial patterns. The ﬁrst involves a ran-
dom distribution of an equal number of White and Black
households. In the second case there is no control on the ratio be-
tween the White and Black population, as long as the aggregate
population equal to N * N. However it should be noted that, in
the both cases, the number of Blacks and Whites, once after a sim-
ulation has started, would remain ﬁxed until the end of the
simulation.
3.8. Assessing the segregation pattern
Recall Schelling’s key discovery: Segregation would always
arise, even though individual agents only have a very mild racial
preference. Will this discordance between ‘‘Micromotives and
Macrobehaviours’’ (Schelling, 1978) persist in a regulated Schelling
model? To answer this question, one needs to monitor the segrega-
tion pattern. For this purpose an indicator is adapted from Moran’s
I to speciﬁcally measure the overall degree of segregation:2
jIt j ¼
XNN
i¼1
Xn
k¼1
½Xk;t 
XNN
i¼1
Xi;t=ðN  NÞ=½Xi;t 
XNN
i¼1
Xi;t=ðN  NÞ

 ð11Þ
where
Xi;t ¼ 0; if ; s
i;t ¼ w
1; if ; si;t ¼ b
(
ð12Þ
and cell k is one of cell i’s neighbours, including but not limited to
cell j. n is the total count of neighbours and for most cells, n = 8. n
might be less than eight for cells at the municipal borders.
Given the statistical properties of Moran’s I, the value of It falls
in the range of [1, 1] (Odland, 1988). In the context of this model,
It ¼ 1, if the entire municipality sees a complete separation be-
tween White and Black households. In another extreme, It ¼ 1,
if a household, wherever it lives within the municipality, always
ﬁnds all of its neighbours to be from the other ethnic group. Finally,
It ¼ 0, if every household is located in a racially mixed neighbour-
hood, with half of the neighbours being White and the other half
being Black. Thus, jIt j, the absolute value of It, has a value range
as [0, 1]. A larger value in jItj indicates a racially segregated pattern
overall, whereas a smaller value suggests the municipality to be
relatively more integrated in racial terms.
4. Results
The model results are presented below in two ways. The ﬁrst in-
volves a case study of sample simulations, by comparing the sim-
ulation outcomes with the initial statuses and monitoring the
transition trajectories of wt and jIt j. The primary goal here is to rep-
licate the classic ﬁndings by Schelling (1971).2 The more conventional segregation indices such as the dissimilarity index are not
suitable in this case, wherein the boundary of neighbourhood is self-referenced (given
a cell’s own location) rather than delineated exogenously as in Massey and Denton
(1989), for example.
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ference that the Pigovian regulatory control can make to the simu-
lation outcomes. The target measures are still wt and jIt j. Their
values at the end of 200 simulations, half involving regulation
and half not, are compared using paired sample t-test, to see
whether there is a signiﬁcant difference in their population means.4.1. A case study of simulation results
Fig. 3 below illustrates a sample comparison between two sim-
ulations that both start from the same random pattern shown in
Fig. 3(1), when N = 10 and an equal number of Black and White
households (i.e., 50 each) are involved in the model. The simulation
involving no regulatory control stops when t = 29 and ends up with
the pattern shown in Fig. 3(2). Although the average utility has in-
creased from w0 = 0.600 to w29 = 0.950, the ﬁnal pattern becomes
more racially segregated, given the rise from jI0j = 0.055 to
jI29j = 0.452. This result resonates with Schelling’s classic ﬁnding
that segregation would eventually dominate notwithstanding indi-
viduals’ general indifference to their neighbours’ racial identities.
Compared with Fig. 3(2) and (3) displays a more racially inte-
grated residential pattern. The simulation involving regulation
stops at t = 28, with w28 = 0.900 and |I28| = 0.200. Although the ﬁnal
residential pattern is still more segregated than the initial one, the
exercise of regulation has prevented further segregation which
otherwise would become the pattern as shown in Fig. 3(2).
Figs. 4 and 5 below compare the trend of wt and |It| between the
two simulations. The horizontal axes in the both ﬁgures count iter-
ations, t, while the vertical axes respectively show the value of wt
and |It|. In Fig. 4 the trend of wt for the unregulated simulation is
marked with blank squares. For the regulated simulation, the
marks are solid squares. Conceivably the former regulated simula-
tion eventually attains a higher level of collective utility, though
with a bit of ﬂuctuations in the value of wt over the course.
Yet also notice that wt has never declined in the second simulation
but rather kept rising until it stabilizes at the level of 0.900. This
ﬁnding seems to conﬁrm the analytical insights carried in Eq. (7)
above, namely that the average utility never declines.
In Fig. 5 the trend of |It| for the unregulated simulation is
marked with blank triangles. For the regulated simulation, the
marks are the solid triangles. Both trends consist of ups and downs,
while the trajectory for the regulated simulation seems a bit more
stable and eventually results in a lower level of segregation.
A large number of trial simulations, including those with a ran-
dom number (i.e., not necessarily 50:50) of Blacks and Whites, are
also experimented with. The pattern summarized in the above case
study however seems fairly robust. Almost all of the automations
end up with a more segregated pattern and yet also reaches a high-
er level of aggregate utility compared with the initial status. This
ﬁnding is essentially consistent with that by Schelling some
40 years ago.
Schelling of course did not run a simulation that involves regu-
latory control, so he lacked an opportunity to compare the results
of regulated versus unregulated simulations. The above case how-
ever suggests that the two types of simulations may engender very
different consequences, whether in terms of utility or in terms of
the spatial pattern of segregation. While the structural differences
illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5 above seem to be quite commonplace
and almost constantly recurring, there is indeed a small number
of observations that do not follow suit. Hence an important ques-
tion arises, that whether or not there is a generalizable difference
in wt and |It| between the regulated and non-regulated simula-
tions? The next section addresses this question using inferential
statistics.gation under regulation. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems (2013),
Fig. 3. A sample comparison between two simulations, N = 10.
Fig. 4. Comparing the trends of wt between two simulations.
Fig. 5. Comparing the trends of |It| between two simulations.
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regulation
Since the computer randomizes the initial pattern for every
simulation and each simulation is an independent data generation
procedure, the simulation results are deployable for some standardPlease cite this article in press as: Wang, Y. Beyond preference: Modelling segre
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compenvurbsys.2013.09.003inferential statistical tests. Although, in theory, a sufﬁciently large
number of computerised simulations can exhaust all of the possi-
ble model outcomes, which then can be compared simply using
conventional descriptive statistics, the interest here is however in
whether one can see a signiﬁcant difference in a relatively small
number (e.g., 100) of simulations. This thus calls for comparinggation under regulation. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems (2013),
Table 5
Comparing the outcome average utility (random Black-White ratio).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome
average
utility (wt)
No 100 .956 .022 .002
Yes 100 .931 .021 .002
Table 6
Difference in the mean of average utility (random Black/White).
Paired differences in outcome average utility (wt)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.025 .032 7.722 99 .000 .003
Table 7
Comparing the outcome degree of segregation (random Black/White).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome degree
of segregation
(|It|)
No 100 .434 .106 .011
Yes 100 .346 .092 .010
Table 8
Difference in the mean degree of segregation (random Black/White).
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a more systematic and rigorous fashion than individual case
studies.
To generate data 100 unregulated simulations and 100 regu-
lated automations are run in a pairwise fashion, ﬁrstly based on
some random initial states involving 50White and 50 Black agents.
The simulation outcomes are compared using paired samplet-test
and the test results are summarized in the following tables. Tables
1 and 2 below basically suggest that, in this setting, Pigovian reg-
ulation tends to generate a signiﬁcantly lower level of average util-
ity than laissez faire. By contrast, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the
regulation tends to result in a signiﬁcantly less segregated racial
residential pattern compared with the laissez faire in the Schelling
(1971) original.
Almost essentially the same results arise even if the number of
Whites and Blacks are allowed to be uneven at the beginning of the
simulations. However N must remain ﬁxed and in this case N = 10
for all the simulations. Otherwise the simulation results would be-
come incomparable. For instance the value of |It| would be system-
atically smaller for larger N, according to Fotheringham and
Wong’s (1991) seminal study on the modiﬁable areal unit problem
of spatial autocorrelation.
Tables 5 and 6 are the counterparts of Tables 1 and 2 above,
while the ratio between Whites and Blacks is purely stochastic.
Again regulation seems to result in a signiﬁcantly lower level of
average utility compared with no regulation. Similarly Tables 7
and 8 convey essentially the same message as Tables 3 and 4. That
is, Pigovian regulation tends to prevent racial segregation which
otherwise would be inevitable in a world devoid of regulatory
control.Table 1
Comparing the outcome average utility (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome
average
utility (wt)
No 100 .954 .015 .002
Yes 100 .938 .022 .002
Table 2
Difference in the mean of average utility (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Paired differences in outcome average utility (wt)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.016 .028 5.796 99 .000 .003
Table 3
Comparing the outcome degree of segregation (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome degree
of segregation
(|It|)
No 100 .434 .087 .009
Yes 100 .383 .100 .010
Table 4
Difference in the mean degree of segregation (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Paired differences in the outcome degree of segregation (|It|)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.051 .103 4.924 99 .000 .010
Paired differences in the outcome degree of segregation (|It|)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.088 .119 7.384 99 .000 .012
Please cite this article in press as: Wang, Y. Beyond preference: Modelling segre
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5.1. Why regulation results in less segregation?
The outcomes of cellular automata clearly suggest that the exer-
cise of Pigovian regulation tends to result in a less segregated res-
idential pattern than the laissez faire scenario modelled in the
Schelling original. This can be understood, ﬁrst of all, by recognis-
ing that the Pigovian regulation in this model actually favours the
local residents and tends to discourage moving. In other words,
whether the initial pattern is an integrated or segregated one,
the regulation, in effect, tends to preserve the status quo compared
with the free moving mechanism set in the original Schelling
(1971) model; every household simply tends to have less degree
of freedom under regulation.
Secondly, recall that in this paper all of the initial states are ran-
domized by the computer. The probability of generating the ﬁrst
group of neighbouring cells which all accommodate same-race
households is actually very small, given Eq. (13) below:
Pr¼ ðr 1Þ=ðN N 1Þ  ðr2Þ=ðN N2Þ . . .  ðr nÞ=ðN N nÞ
ð13Þ
r in Eq. (13) stands for the subtotal population within a partic-
ular racial group, such as Black or White. N * N gives the aggregate
municipal population. n counts the number of neighbours for a
household living upon a speciﬁc cell. Given the deﬁnition of neigh-
bourhood in this study n = 8 for most cells that are not located at
the boarders. Suppose 50 Whites and 50 Blacks upon a 10 * 10 mu-
nicipal space, as studied above. In that case, Pr, the probability ofgation under regulation. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems (2013),
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hood is less than 0.003. The probability for each and every neigh-
borhood to be completely segregated would actually be even
smaller than that. In this vein, it is simply much more likely to start
a simulation from a mixed beginning pattern, which later tends to
be preserved by the Pigovian regulation set up in the model.
5.2. Why regulation results in less utility?
By economic theory, a Pigovian intervention should improve
efﬁciency. Yet the Pigovian regulation modelled in this paper
seems to produce less collective utility than laissez faire. One pos-
sible explanation is associated with Eq. (7) and related to the issue
of path dependency (Arthur, 1994). According to Eq. (7), the aver-
age collective utility, wt, would never decline in the course of any
simulation insofar as there is regulatory control. However one
should note that this is neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient condition
to maximize the overall utility at the end of the simulations. In fact
Fig. 4 suggests that a higher level of utility can be reached eventu-
ally without regulation, even though the level of utility may ﬂuctu-
ate during the course of simulation. This ﬁnding is intriguing
because it suggests that long run utility gains may be locked off
by short term maximization behaviour.
Another, and perhaps even more pertinent, explanation is that
the Pigovian regulation modelled here only deals with negative
externalities (i.e., Ei$j;t < 0 in Eq. (6)) which end up as social cost
(i.e., ni$j;t < 0) for the entire municipality. However, there is indeed
a possibility that a privately unproﬁtable (i.e., Pi$j;t < 0) relocation
may improve collective welfare (i.e., ni$j;t > 0), in which case, a
subsidybecomes necessary to compensate for the substantial posi-
tive externalities (i.e., Ei$j;t > ni$j;t > 0). What is missing in the cur-
rent Pigovian regulation is thus a reward or incentive scheme that
encourages individual transactions and relocations that may seem
unviable from a private accounting perspective, but do yield net
social beneﬁts for all. From an economics perspective, this may ex-
plain why the public sector in practice often takes inclusionary
planning measures, such as rent control, affordable housing or
inclusionary zoning, to subsidize lower income ethnic minorities
and encourage them to move into White dominated middle class
communities.
5.3. Reconciling preferences and institutions
On top of the admittedly mild policy implications discussed
above, the cellular automata conducted in this study exemplify
an integrated perspective to study preferential as well as institu-
tional factors underlying the phenomenon of racial residential seg-
regation. Many recent inquiries have already moved in this
direction (e.g., Benenson et al., 2009; Grauwin et al., 2009; Nelson
et al., 2004; Pancs & Vriend, 2007; Rothwell & Massey, 2009). Fol-
lowing suit, this paper employs a bottom-up computational mod-
elling approach, featuring a large number of cellular automata of
which the programming is guided by some classic microeconomic
principles.
This paper, alongside many other similar efforts in recent years,
also has important implications for the general discipline of urban
planning. In his recent paper entitled ‘‘Should planners start play-
ing computer games’’, Devisch (2008) posits that seemingly game-
like urban computational models can enable planners to better
understand the complex process of social and spatial evolution.
Compared with the traditional and more deterministic methods
such as regression or input-output analysis, bottom-up computa-
tional models are uniquely sensitive to myopic agent behaviour,
bounded rationality, path dependency, social and spatial interac-
tions, all of which are particularly relevant to the practice of urban
planning (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Schon, 1983).Please cite this article in press as: Wang, Y. Beyond preference: Modelling segre
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Employing a cellular automaton approach, this paper revisits
Schelling’s (1971) spatial proximity model of racial segregation.
As in the Schelling original, racial integration appears to be system-
atically untenable insofar as the agents are allowed to move freely
between neighbourhoods. However, the simulation results also
suggest that a Pigovian regulation to preserve collective welfare
may alleviate the degree of eventual segregation, which otherwise
would be muchmore substantial under the laissez faire emulated in
Schelling (1971). Results from inferential statistical tests conﬁrm
the ﬁndings. These discoveries bear intellectual relations to an
important policy question in practice regarding the potential racial
effects of planning interventions. On top of that, this paper show-
cases a bottom-up computational modelling approach which at-
tempts to reconcile the preference-based and institution-
orientated perspectives in the contemporary segregation research.
Like many other computational models, the cellular automata
presented in this paper are also faced with potential challenges
in terms of model veriﬁcation and validation (Crooks et al., 2008;
Xiang et al., 2005). ‘‘Veriﬁcation is the process of making sure that
an implemented model matches its design. Validation is the pro-
cess of making sure that an implemented model matches the
real-world.’’ (Crooks et al., 2008, p. 419). Given the relatively
straightforward model setup in this study, validation is perhaps a
more pressing issue than veriﬁcation. Several improvements can
be made in that respect.
Firstly, a ‘‘parameter variability-sensitive analysis’’ (Xiang et al.,
2005, p.48) can be conducted by inputting into the model alterna-
tive initial segregation conditions or/and different kinds of racial
preference. In fact, Schelling (1971) did explore a variety of indi-
vidual preferential structures in his tipping model, even though
that happened only after he presented his checkerboard model. Gi-
ven the very fast speed of computerized cellular simulation, a large
set of alternative parameters, either based on Schelling (1971) or
other sources, can be experimented with in future to test the
robustness of simulation results reported in this study.
Secondly, the cellular automaton model included in this paper
is conceivably hypothetical, partly because of the Schelling original
it builds upon. However, a lot of efforts have been made in recent
years to link the Schelling style spatial process model with large-
scale empirical spatio-economic dataset, using such apparatuses
as geographic information systems (GIS) (e.g., Benenson et al.,
2009). This offers a potential opportunity to test, calibrate and even
resurrect the assumptions of Schelling original in reference to
empirical observations. Indeed an inferential statistical test frame-
work is applied in this paper upon pseudo data generated by com-
puterized cellular automata. The same thing can thus be done with
actual demographic data that are becoming more and more acces-
sible to the general public.
Thirdly, the kind of model studied in this paper is rather stylized
in terms of the setting of agent behaviour. As in the Schelling ori-
ginal, the deﬁnition of neighbourhood is so homogenous that, even
though every family deﬁnes its own neighbourhood in reference to
the household’s own location, the way of self-mapping is identical
for everyone. However, Coulton et al.’s (2001) empirical study sug-
gests that people tend to perceive the geography of their neigh-
bourhood in very different fashions. Such cognitive heterogeneity
could possibly be accounted for by using an online GIS survey plat-
form which allows users to map their own neighbourhoods.Acknowledgements
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